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Abstract
Although an essential element of the definition of crimes against humanity is that a 
civilian population be targeted, there is no agreement on what ‘civilian population’ 
means in this context. The notion has been given different meanings depending on 
whether the crimes are committed in times of conflict or peacetime. In times of con-
flict, preference is given to a broad approach based on international humanitarian law. 
More problematic is the attribution of a specific content to the notion in peacetime, 
where even discrimination has been suggested as a defining criterion. In this article 
we contend that a single notion of ‘civilian population’ in crimes against humanity 
applicable in every circumstance is needed. Hence, we suggest determining the civil-
ian population on the basis of the rules on State responsibility in international human 
rights law and general international law in order to exclude those endowed with public 
authority from the civilian population.
* Jaume Saura Estapà is a member of the TransJus Research Institute (ub) and Deputy General 
to the Síndic de Greuges (Catalan Ombudsman). This paper was written in the framework 
of the research project La exigibilidad jurídica internacional de los derechos económicos, 
sociales y culturales en períodos de crisis” (Spanish Ministry of Innovation and Science, 
der2012-30652).
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1 Introduction
Certain abhorrent acts that breach fundamental human rights become crimes 
against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population pursuant to a State or organiza-
tional policy, with knowledge of such attack by the author. This specific con-
text provides the general chapeau of the category and makes such criminal 
acts a threat to international peace and security and therefore of such grav-
ity that they must not go unpunished, as the Preamble of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (icc) reminds. Under customary international 
law  – also reflected in Article 7 icc Statute – the general chapeau require-
ments would be the following: (i) there must be an attack; (ii) the acts of the 
perpetrator must be part of the attack; (iii) the attack must be directed against 
any civilian population; (iv) the attack must be widespread or systematic; and 
(v) the perpetrator must know that his acts constitute part of a pattern of wide-
spread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and know 
that his acts fit into such a pattern.1
An essential element of the definition of crimes against humanity is there-
fore that the attack targets any civilian population. Even so, there exists no 
agreement on what should be understood by ‘any civilian population’ and who 
should be included in it. The original configuration of crimes against human-
ity in Article 6(c) of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg (imtn) connecting them to war crimes and crimes against peace – 
therefore to a situation of international armed conflict – leads to an initial an-
swer: it should be interpreted in light of International humanitarian law (ihl). 
However, the conceptual autonomy reached by crimes against humanity in 
customary international law since 19452 asks for a specific meaning within this 
1 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., 12 June 2002, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia [‘icty’], Appeal Judgment, it-96-23 & it-96-23/1-a, para. 65; The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, 7 March 2014, icc, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, icc-01/ 
04-01/07, paras. 1097–1099.
2 The nexus with an armed conflict was already suppressed in Article ii(1)(c) of Control Coun-
cil Law N°. 10. Although Article 5 of the Statute of the icty re-introduced it, the Tribunal 
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criminal category. Although assuming that ihl should be the primary refer-
ence to define the term, international tribunals and commentators have since 
tended to broaden its scope as an element of crimes against humanity.
The icc Statute sheds no light on the scope of this term, as the drafters 
consciously left its exact meaning undefined. According to Lee, ‘[m]ost del-
egations quickly agreed that this was too complex a subject and evolving area 
in the law, better left to resolution in case-law’.3 Consistently, no explanation 
of the meaning of ‘civilian population’ in Article 7 icc Statute is offered in 
the icc Elements of Crimes either.4 References to civilian population in war 
crimes included in Article 8 icc Statute remains equally undefined.5 Adding 
further confusion, the icc case-law is not congruous, as a twofold criterion is 
currently used to determine the civilian nature of a population.
The meaning of the term ‘civilian population’ is not self-evident, and the 
lack of a uniform definition for it is quite undesirable in a field such as the 
application of criminal rules, that require a high degree of certainty and preci-
sion in order to fulfil the principle of legality. Today, it seems clear that the term 
does not bear the same meaning in war crimes and in crimes against humanity, 
as crimes against humanity can be committed both in times of armed conflict 
and in peacetime. So, there is an evident need to reassess the scope given to the 
term so far, in order to provide it with a single and comprehensive meaning. 
The civilian population needs to be determined in a way suitable to any pos-
sible scenario where these crimes are committed. As we shall see, the icc gives 
the term a different content within the category of crimes against humanity, 
depending on whether they are committed in times of war or peace: in armed 
conflicts, ‘civilian population’ includes those who are not members of armed 
forces and other legitimate combatants, while in peacetime it is equated to a 
distinguishable group. Such duality makes no sense and should be urgently 
overcome.
In this article, we contend none of the approaches currently provided 
to determine the civilian population in crimes against humanity are fully 
stated that ‘an examination of customary international law indicates that as customary rules 
on crimes against humanity gradually crystallised after 1945, the link between crimes against 
humanity and war crimes disappeared’ (Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., 14 January 2000, icty, 
Trial Judgment, it-95-16-t, para. 577).
3 Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Evidence 
(Transnational Publishers, New York, 2001), p. 78.
4 icc, Elements of Crimes (icc-asp/1/3, Part ii.B), Introduction to Article 7, p. 5.
5 See e.g., the elements of the crime in Article 8(2)(b)(i) (ibid., p. 130). The Elements of Crimes 
do explain instead what civilian objects are (‘that is, objects which are not military objec-
tives’, according to the elements of the crime in Article 8(2)(b)(ii), in ibid.).
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 satisfactory, and further criteria need to be explored. For a better under-
standing of the evolution of the scope given to the civilian population as an 
 element of the general chapeau of crimes against humanity and its persisting 
 shortcomings, we will first focus on its delimitation in ihl (Section 2). We then 
move to the double standard used to determine it in crimes against human-
ity: the broadening of the ihl approach operated by international criminal 
tribunals in order to adapt the element to the particular features of crimes 
against humanity committed in times of conflict, followed by the different 
 criteria offered by the international case-law to determine the civilian popula-
tion in times of peace (Section 3). With this general outlook in mind, we will 
put forward an alternative criterion inspired by international human rights law 
(Section 4), to end up with some conclusions (Section 5).
2 The Distinction between Combatants and Civilians in 
International Humanitarian Law
One, if not the most important, rule of International humanitarian law is the 
principle of distinction between combatants and civilians. Not surprisingly, 
the impressive compilation of customary ihl produced by the icrc6 estab-
lishes, as Rule #1, that ‘[t]he parties to the conflict must at all times distin-
guish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against 
 combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians’.7
This crucial principle begs the question of identifying both categories of 
 individuals, a distinction that international humanitarian law does not per-
form directly. The notion of ‘combatant’ is found essentially in the Third Ge-
neva Convention, as only lawful combatants can eventually become, when 
captured, prisoners of war (‘pow’). Instead, ‘civilians’ are not defined, although 
it can be derived that theirs is a negative notion, as reflected by Rule #5 of the 
customary norms of the icrc: ‘Civilians are persons who are not members of the 
armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians’.8
6 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press/International Committee of the Red Cross, Cam-
bridge, 2004, repr. 2009), p. 3.
7 As a matter of fact, the compilation dedicates its first six ‘rules’ to the principle of distinction 
between civilians and combatants, and the following four rules to the distinction between 
military objectives and civilian property (emphasis added).
8 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, p. 17.
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In the context of an international armed conflict, individuals are basical-
ly either combatants (Section 2.1) or civilians (Section 2.2). Among civilians, 
some have a differentiated status (e.g., journalists and humanitarian person-
nel), just as there are unique situations among the former group (e.g., medical 
and religious personnel that belong to regular armies but are not considered 
combatants). Combatants hors de combat become something else (‘wounded’, 
‘prisoner of war’…) that derives from the status as combatant. Finally, non-
international armed conflicts (niac) demand the same distinction between 
combatants and civilians as the international ones, but in their context the 
lack of certainty about who is a civilian remains quite high (Section 2.3).
2.1 Combatants in International Armed Conflicts: Their Right  
to Become pows
Within the rationale of international humanitarian law, a combatant is not 
per se, a criminal, nor has any responsibility over the crimes committed by 
his government, i.e. an illegal use of armed force. In an international armed 
conflict, a combatant that falls in the hands of enemy forces can be retained 
with one main purpose: to impede him from re-joining his armed forces. 
 Additionally, and with important limitations, international humanitarian law 
allows the  Detaining Power to obtain from him two valued goods: information 
and  labour. But in no case he is or should be punished for having combated.9 
This explains most of the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention (gciii) 
in relation with the conditions of detention and with the rights and duties at-
tributed to the pow and his captors, including the fact that, once the armed 
conflict is over, the pow must be freed and repatriated immediately. This is 
also why the Convention devotes quite an effort to determine who is a legiti-
mate combatant.
The gciii defines a pow as any combatant that has been captured by en-
emy forces. Combatant is, thus, a category defined with a single purpose: the 
recognition of the pow status.
Combatants are, primarily but not only, any member of the regular armed 
forces of a State and assimilated bodies, even if they belong to governments not 
recognized by the Detaining Power (paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 4 gciii).10 
9 John Hickman, ‘What is a Prisoner of War For?’, 36(2) Scientia Militaria: South African 
Journal of Military Studies (2008) 1–17.
10 On lawful and unlawful combatants, see, among many others: Mary E. O’Connell, 
‘ Combatants and the Combat Zone’, 43 University of Richmond Law Review (2008–2009) 
845, and Knut Dörmann, ‘The legal situation of “unlawful/unprivileged combatants”’, 
85(489) International Revue of the Red Cross (2003) 45.
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Also, other categories of individuals in arms are considered lawful combatants 
in Article 4(2), as long as they meet specific requirements that are implied (but 
not formally required) for regular armed forces. Thus:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, includ-
ing those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the 
conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this terri-
tory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including 
such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d)  that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war.
Even groups of civilians that spontaneously take up arms ‘to resist the invading 
forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, 
provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war’ 
(thus not meeting the first two requirements mentioned in paragraph 4) are 
considered combatants by Article 4(6) gciii.
Thus, there is a strong presumption that a person in arms, in the context of 
an international armed conflict, is a legitimate combatant. Even more so if we 
consider what Article 5 gciii provides when there are ‘doubts’ on the condi-
tion of combatant or non-combatant of individuals in arms detained in an 
international armed conflict:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a bel-
ligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any 
of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the 
 protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.11
Whether a ‘doubt’ exists or not does not depend on the spirits of the De-
taining Power. A doubt exists when it ‘appears’ that the individual may be a 
 combatant, but also, very importantly, as long as the individual himself or his 
country claims such status. Article 45(1) Additional Protocol i to the Geneva 
Conventions (api) is clear in this respect and develops Article 5 gciii in the 
following way:
11 Emphasis added.
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A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an ad-
verse Party shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war, and therefore shall 
be protected by the Third Convention, if he claims the status of prison-
er of war, or if he appears to be entitled to such status, or if the Party on 
which he depends claims such status on his behalf by notification to the 
detaining Power or to the Protecting Power. Should any doubt arise as to 
whether any such person is entitled to the status of prisoner of war, he 
shall continue to have such status and, therefore, to be protected by the 
Third Convention and this Protocol until such time as his status has been 
 determined by a competent tribunal.12
It is enough for a detained person or his country to claim his condition as a 
pow in order for the Detaining Power to presume he was a legitimate com-
batant. And such an allegation can be expressed at any time, even when he is 
judged for crimes related to the conflict, in which case the competent tribunals 
must give priority to the claim – Article 45(2) api.
2.2 Civilians, Particularly Those in Arms
Civilians ‘are to be protected from the dangers arising from military operations 
and are not to be the object of an attack’.13 Other protective measures in fa-
vour of the ‘civilian population’ include the prohibition of attacks to objects 
indispensable for their survival as well as their forced displacement. These 
measures are addressed towards the civilian population of the other bellig-
erent party, i.e. enemy civilians. It is interesting to mention that the Geneva 
 regime contains a few duties concerning each party’s own civilian population 
(e.g., they cannot transfer it to an occupied territory14 and must disseminate 
international humanitarian law among it),15 none of which is focused on their 
protection.
As seen earlier, a civilian is anyone who is ‘not a member of the armed 
forces’.16 Article 50 api defines a civilian in a negative fashion as ‘[a]ny person 
who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 
12 Emphasis added.
13 Kenneth W. Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflicts in the 21st  Century, 
International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative Seminar Paper (2003), p. 2, <www 
.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session2.pdf>, 23 September 2016.
14 See Article 49 in fine of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
15 Article 83 api and Article 19 Additional Protocol ii (which binds the Government and 
armed opposition groups).
16 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, p. 17.
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4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this  Protocol’. 
Civilians are, thus, not only alien to the ‘armed forces’, but more broadly, 
non-combatants.17
Article 50 further clarifies that ‘the civilian population comprises all per-
sons who are civilians’ and that ‘the presence within the civilian population 
of  individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not de-
prive the population of its civilian character’. The most striking provision in 
this article is that ‘in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person 
shall be considered to be a civilian’. This potentially collides with the above 
mentioned presumption of pow status ‘in case of doubt’ and must be thus 
understood in the context of the ‘protection’ of civilians against armed attacks 
and not necessarily in the context of their detention for taking up arms.18
In this respect, civilians ‘enjoy this protection until such time as they take 
a direct part in hostilities’.19 Nonetheless, a civilian in arms is still a civilian, 
although he is no longer protected from direct attacks. From the point of view 
of his treatment as a detained individual, any person to whom the gciii is 
not applicable (either because he is a pure civilian or because he has taken up 
arms in a fashion not contemplated in any of the above provisions) is under 
the protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention (gciv). Article 4 of this Con-
vention as well as api clearly determine the absence of any lacuna in the treat-
ment of individuals involved or affected by an international armed conflict 
with the widest possible definition of ‘protected persons’:
Persons protected by the Convention are those who at a given moment 
and  in any manner whatsoever find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of 
which they are not nationals.20
Besides, Part ii of gciv, entitled ‘General Protection of Populations Against 
Certain Consequences of War’, applies to ‘the whole of the populations of the 
countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on 
race, nationality, religion or political opinion’ (Article 13, emphasis added). 
17 In this respect, it is worth noting that the excluded paragraphs refer to civilian individuals 
and crews that accompany armed forces without being members thereof. These individu-
als enjoy pow status without losing their civilian condition.
18 In this respect, it is important to recall that the doubt mentioned in Article 4 gciii refers 
to ‘persons, having committed a belligerent act’ (emphasis added).
19 Article 51 api. See Watkin, supra note 13, p. 2.
20 Emphasis added.
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Moreover, the third paragraph of the above mentioned Article 45(3) api es-
tablishes that:
Any person who has taken part in hostilities, who is not entitled to pris-
oner-of-war status and who does not benefit from more favourable treat-
ment in accordance with the Fourth Convention shall have the right at all 
times to the protection of Article 75 of this Protocol.21
Thus, a civilian who takes part in hostilities does so illegally and can be pun-
ished for this reason by the Detaining Power, unlike what we have predi-
cated  earlier about combatants. But he remains a civilian. The Geneva re-
gime does not give carte blanche to the Detaining Power. The ‘illegitimate’ or 
‘ unprivileged’ combatant is protected by Article 75 api. This provision forbids 
murder,  torture, corporal punishments, mutilation and any form of degrading 
or humiliating treatment. It also establishes some minimum procedural guar-
antees of a due process. In this fashion, the Protocol is consistent and builds 
upon what Article 71 gciv was already establishing: ‘No sentence shall be 
 pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a 
regular trial’.22
All civilians are non-combatants even if they take up arms, but they are not 
the only ones. A specific category of non-combatants consists of the medi-
cal and religious personnel that are members of the regular armed forces of a 
given State. This status protects them from enemy attacks, but again, only ‘as 
long as they do not directly participate in hostilities’.23 Potentially, if they take 
up arms, doctors and chaplains may also become illegitimate or unprivileged 
combatants and face similar consequences as civilians directly participating 
in hostilities.
21 Emphasis added.
22 This article and the ones following develop the idea of a fair trial in an armed conflict 
 situation. Eventually, a civilian that has taken up arms against a foreign or occupying 
power may be criminally charged and sentenced to prison. In some cases (spies, grave 
acts of sabotage or international breaches causing the death of one or more people) he 
could be sentenced to death penalty (Article 68), but always within the framework of a 
fair trial and a humane treatment.
23 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, p. 13. Likewise, while in the power of the 
enemy, they shall not become pow although they shall be treated as such: ‘They shall, 
however, receive as a minimum the benefits and protection of the present Convention’ 
(Article 33 gciii).
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2.3 Combatants and Civilians in Non-international Armed Conflicts
The different status between civilians and combatants is further blurred in the 
context of niac. In such conflicts, there is a lack of legitimacy to carry out hos-
tilities at least on the side of the ‘rebels’. They are not legitimate combatants 
and pow status for those who fall in the hands of the enemy, in either side, 
does not exist. Surprisingly enough, States have abstained from providing any 
plausible definition of combatants also on the Governmental side:
it is overwhelmingly apparent that States have not made any clear 
 commitment of the issue of government forces’ status in niac to interna-
tional Law. Considerations including lack of necessity, general reluctance 
to yield sovereignty over internal affairs and lack of consensus have all 
contributed to the niac legal void.24
In spite of the above, the principle of distinction is fully in force also in niac, 
for Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol ii (‘apii’), among others, ‘prohibits 
making the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, the ob-
ject of attack’.25 This prohibition ‘necessarily implies that there must be other 
individuals falling outside this protection who are subject to a presumption 
of targetability’.26 In sum, in niac there are combatants and civilians, but it is 
hard to know who is who.
apii does not contain a definition of civilian or of civilian population, 
 although there are numerous references to one and the other throughout the 
text. In fact, a provision stating that ‘a civilian is anyone who is not a member 
of the armed forces or of an organized armed group’ was dropped at the last 
moment during the 1977 Conference.27
We must thus resort to indirect references. Common Article 3 to the four 
Geneva Conventions applies to persons ‘taking no active part in the hostilities’, 
but this terminology is too broad as it includes what ihl considers (former) 
combatants in international armed conflicts: ‘including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause’. As we shall see, the ad hoc 
24 Sean Watts, ‘Present and Future Conceptions of the Status of Government Forces in 
 Non-International Armed Conflict’, 88 International Law Studies Series. us Naval War 
 College (2012) 153.
25 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, p. 6. Emphasis added.
26 Geoffrey Corn and Chris Jenks, ‘Two Sides of the Combatant Coin: Untangling Direct 
Participation in Hostilities from Belligerent Status in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 
33(2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (2011–2012) 330.
27 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, p. 19.
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criminal tribunals have equated all these non-combatants to civilians in the 
context of crimes against humanity.28
apii is applicable without discrimination to ‘all persons affected by a 
[ non-international] armed conflict’.29 This includes ‘les personnes qui ne 
prennent pas – ou plus – aux hostilités … ce sont celles qui doivent, au sens 
du Protocole, se conformer à certaines règles de comportement à l’égard de 
l’adversaire et de la population civile’.30 Thus, absolutely everyone is ‘affected’ 
by the niac, including the armed parties.
apii devotes a specific chapter to ‘civilian population’, where we find out 
that ‘civilians’ are immune from direct attack ‘unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities’,31 but again, there is no clue as to how to identify 
these protected individuals.
Based on the above, some authors maintain that everyone is a civilian on 
the side of the rebels and all of them constitute ‘civilian population’ as long as, 
and for the time that, they do not take a direct part in hostilities. This would 
be consistent with the fact that, once detained, they will not enjoy pow  status 
( although they should be treated humanely and prosecuted fairly). As pin-
pointed by one commentator: ‘opposition fighters captured in niac, no matter 
their appearances or conduct, are likely to be regarded as mere criminals, fully 
subject to the domestic penal regime of the territorial State’.32 It also makes 
sense within the widely prevalent contemporary non-international armed 
conflicts, which are unstructured.33
Nonetheless, this interpretation has raised numerous criticisms and is 
 particularly shocking if we envision a ‘classic’ non-international armed conflict 
with organized rebels that essentially meet the requirements of  belligerency.34 
In fact, according to the icrc Commentary to Article 13(3) apii, people 
28 See infra Section 3.
29 Article 22 (emphasis added).
30 Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, Commentaire des Protocoles additionnels du 8 juin 
1977 aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 (cicr, Genève, 1986), para. 4485, p. 1383.
31 Article 1 (3) apii.
32 Watts, supra note 24, p. 148.
33 Jacques Forster, ‘The 60th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions and the 150th anni-
versary of the idea of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’, in Marco Odello and 
Gian Luca Beruto (eds.), Non-State Actors and International humanitarian law. Organized 
Armed Groups: A Challenge for the 21st Century. 32nd Round Table on Current Issues of Inter-
national humanitarian law, Sanremo, 11–13 September 2009 (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2010), 
p. 233.
34 Corn and Jenks, supra note 26, p. 331: ‘This interpretation is fatally flawed … as it 
 distorts the fundamental lines of authority and obligation historically associated with 
armed conflict’.
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 belonging to armed forces ‘or to the armed groups may be attacked at any time’ 
(e.g., in their headquarters), unlike civilians in arms that can only be attacked 
when they actively participate in hostilities.35
The question remains open and the more recent icrc Compilation 
 acknowledges that ‘practice is not clear as to whether members of armed 
 opposition groups are civilians subject to Rule 6 on loss of protection from 
attack in case of direct participation or whether members of such groups are 
liable to  attack as such’.36 For our purposes, it becomes obvious that the no-
tion of ‘ civilian population’, which is of paramount importance to define war 
crimes, suffers a progressive blurring as we move from international to non-
international armed conflicts. This process of indeterminacy of the notion will 
 further intensify as we consider crimes against humanity, particularly in times 
of peace.
3 Any ‘Civilian Population’ as an Element of the General Chapeau of 
Crimes against Humanity: An Unsuitable Double Standard
Although crimes against humanity can be committed both in times of armed 
conflict and in times of peace, the meaning given to the ‘civilian population’ 
element in this criminal category has been traditionally based on the ihl 
 definition of the term. Admittedly, it has been later broadened – particularly as 
far as the civilian element is concerned – in order to provide it with a content 
of its own within crimes against humanity. As a result, civilian status is not only 
granted to non-combatants, but even to combatants (Section 3.1).  Nonetheless, 
while this distinction can work in the context of an armed conflict, it becomes 
insufficient when crimes against humanity are committed in times of peace. 
This would explain the jurisprudential development of an alternative criterion 
based on discrimination that would apply to situations where no armed con-
flict can be verified (Section 3.2).
35 Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, supra note 30, para. 4789, p. 1475.
36 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, p. 19. It adds that ‘most manuals define civil-
ians negatively with respect to combatants and armed forces and are silent on the status 
of members of armed opposition groups’. A few years later, another research of the icrc 
was a bit clearer: ‘all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized 
armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection 
against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’ (Nils 
Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International humanitarian law (icrc, Geneva, 2009), p. 36).
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3.1 Broadening the ihl Definition
In search of a definition of ‘civilian population’ specific to crimes against 
 humanity, both international tribunals and commentators have opted for 
a broad approach that emphasizes the collective nature of the target of the 
attack. Thus, the term population has been interpreted extensively, referring 
rather to the collective dimension of the crime and not so much to the status of 
the victims.37 Therefore, individual or isolated acts are excluded from the cat-
egory of crimes against humanity.38 However, a plurality of victims in the same 
act is not a requirement in the general chapeau of the category,39 but that the 
context where crimes against humanity are committed involves a multiplicity 
of victims. This is implied both in the notion of attack40 (namely, a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts, as referred to in Article 7(1) 
icc Statute)41 against any civilian population and in that the attack is required 
to be widespread or systematic. The above does not mean that the commission 
of a specific crime against humanity results in many victims, a single inhu-
man act committed against one victim alone being a crime against humanity 
 provided such act is connected to the attack.42 The number of victims caused 
by one act is then irrelevant for the purposes of describing it as a crime against 
humanity. What matters, instead, is that the attack is not directed against a 
37 Prosecutor v. Jelisić, 14 December 1999, icty, Trial Judgment, it-95-10-t, para. 54.
38 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 21 March 2016, icc, Judgment pursuant to 
 Article 74 of the Statute, icc-01/05-01/08, para. 152; Prosecutor v. Tadić, 7 May 1997, icty, 
Trial Judgment, it-94-1-t, para. 644; Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s 
Guide to The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, vol. 1 ( Transnational 
Publishers, Irvington-on-Hudson, 1995), p. 80.
39 Henri Meyrowitz, La répression par les tribunaux allemands des crimes contre l’humanité 
et de l’appartenance à une organisation criminelle, en application de la loi n° 10 du Conseil 
de Contrôle Allié (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence R. Pichon et R. Durand-
Auzias, Paris, 1960), pp. 280–281; Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal 
Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2005), p. 221. But see Egon Schwelb, ‘Crimes against 
 Humanity’, 23 British Yearbook of International Law (1946) 191; unwcc, History of the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (H. M. 
Stationery Office, London, 1948), p. 193; Morris and Scharf, supra note 38, pp. 79–80; María 
Dolores Bollo Arocena, Derecho internacional penal. Estudio de los crímenes internaciona-
les y de las técnicas para la represión (Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibert-
sitatea, Bilbao, 2004), pp. 93–94.
40 Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, ‘The Current Law of Crimes against Humanity. An analysis 
of untaet Regulation 15/2000’, 13(1) Criminal Law Forum (2002) 22.
41 According to Article 7(2) icc Statute.
42 Meyrowitz, supra note 39, p. 281.
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small and randomly selected number of individuals,43 but, on the contrary, 
against a collective target, hence resulting in many victims.
It should also be pinpointed that generic references to any44 or a45 civil-
ian population included in treaty and case-law definitions of crimes against 
humanity have traditionally intended to eliminate any possible difference be-
tween people under the jurisdiction of the State as part of its population or of 
any other territory under its effective control. Crimes against humanity can be 
committed against people of the same nationality as the offender, against for-
eigners or stateless people.46 No part of the civilian population will therefore 
be excluded from the protection afforded by the prohibition to commit crimes 
against humanity.47 Likewise, these two references exclude that the object of 
the attack must be the entire civilian population. On the contrary, it will be 
sufficient that this attack is aimed against part of a civilian population within 
a certain geographical area.48  As remarked by the Supreme Court of Israel in 
the Pal case,
‘civilian population’ is a broad term which includes also part of a civilian 
population (…). For instance, in a town where the majority of the popula-
tion were Nazis, acts of extermination of a Polish minority would be acts 
of extermination of a civilian population.49
The key question, though, is the verification of the civilian nature of the popula-
tion. To that end, international tribunals have usually followed ihl standards: 
43 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, supra note 1, para. 1105.
44 See generally Article 7 icc Statute.
45 See e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., supra note 1, para. 87–88.
46 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 38, para. 635; International Law Commission, Report of 
the International Law Commission covering its 2nd Session, 5 June – 29 July 1950 (A/1316), 
para. 124; Schwelb, supra note 39, p. 206. In Fenrick’s opinion, this reference makes irrel-
evant not only victims’ nationality, but also their ethnicity (William J. Fenrick, ‘The Crime 
against Humanity of Persecution in the Jurisprudence of the icty’, xxxii Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law (2001) 86).
47 Ambos and Wirth, supra note 40, p. 22.
48 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 38, para. 644; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, 7 June 2001, Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [‘ictr’], Trial Judgment, ictr-95-1a-t; para. 80; 
Fenrick, supra note 46, p. 86; Werle, supra note 39, p. 223.
49 Pal v. Attorney-General, 6 June 1952, Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals, in 18 International Law Reports (1952) 542. Civilians confined in a detention 
center keeping them apart from the rest of the population are also part of the civilian 
population (Attorney-General v. Tarnek, 14 December 1951, Tel Aviv District Court, in ibid., 
p. 540).
0002886852.INDD   14 10/20/2016   10:03:32 AM
 15Single & Comprehensive Notion of ‘Civilian Population’ 
international criminal law review 16 (2016) 1-31
301856
the civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians as opposed to 
members of the armed forces and other legitimate combatants, thus relying on 
the broader distinction between combatants and non-combatants set forth in 
Article 50(1) api.50 As the icc Trial Chamber ii expressed in Katanga:
The expression ‘civilian population’ denotes civilians as opposed to 
‘members of armed forces and other legitimate combatants’. As such, 
the Chamber endorses the definition of ‘civilian’ provided by article 50(1) 
of Additional Protocol i and that of ‘civilian population’ provided by 
 article 50(2) of Protocol i, namely ‘[t]he civilian population comprises all 
 persons who are civilians’.51
Also in line with Article 50 api, it is enough for the population targeted by 
the attack to be mainly civilian, what is specially significant in the event of an 
armed conflict, given that in such case the existence of combatants within the 
population does not change in essence its civilian nature.52 By the same token, 
a person shall be considered to be a civilian for as long as there is a doubt as to 
his or her status.53 In this respect, as the Commission of Experts established by 
virtue of resolution 780 (1994) of the Security Council put it,
it seems obvious that article 5 [of the Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘icty’), setting jurisdiction over 
crimes against humanity] applies first and foremost to civilians, meaning 
people who are not combatants. This, however, should not lead to any quick 
conclusions concerning people who at one particular point in time did bear 
arms. (…) Information of the overall circumstances is relevant for the 
 interpretation of the provision in a spirit consistent with its purpose.54
50 See supra Section 2.2.
51 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, supra note 1, para. 1102. See also Prosecutor v. Kunarac 
et al., 22 February 2001, icty, Trial Judgment, it-96-23 & it-96-23/1-t, para. 425.
52 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 38, para. 153; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić 
et al., supra note 2, para. 549; Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 38, para. 638; Prosecutor v. 
 Kunarac et al., supra note 51, para. 425.
53 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., supra note 51, para. 426.
54 Security Council, Letter dated 94/05/24 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
 President of the Security Council (s/1994/674), Annex: ‘Final Report of the Commission 
of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)’, para. 78 
( emphasis added).
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This trend in favour of a broad approach is also observed in case-law. In fact, 
in the trial judgment issued in the Blaskić case, the icty unqualifiedly puts 
civilians on the same level as those protected by common article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions 1949.55 The resulting criteria is to include in the same 
 category of civilians people not taking active part in the hostilities together 
with those members of the armed forces who dropped weapons and those 
left out of combat.56 Besides, people generally who for one reason or another 
are not directly involved in fighting will be deemed civilians.57 Ultimately, ‘the 
specific situation of the victim at the moment the crimes were committed, 
rather than his status, must be taken into account in determining his standing 
as a civilian’.58 In fact, the Appeals Chamber of the icty has held that it is not 
a requirement of crimes against humanity that individual victims are strictly 
civilians.59 Likewise, there is no reason to exclude from the notion of civilian 
those involved in resistance movements as they can also be victims of crimes 
against humanity.60
Commentators pinpoint in this regard that in order to determine the civil-
ian status of a person in the sense required by crimes against humanity, it is 
55 Prosecutor v. Blaskić, 3 March 2000, icty, Trial Judgment, it-95-14-t, para. 209.
56 See Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, 8 October 2008, icty, Appeal Judgment, it-95-11-a, para. 
311; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., 5 May 2009, icty, Appeal Judgment, it-95-13/1-a, para. 29; 
Prosecutor v. Galić, 5 December 2003, icty, Trial Judgment, it-98-29-t, para. 143; Prosecu-
tor v. Akayesu, 2 September 1998, ictr, Trial Judgment, ictr-96-4-t, para. 582. Cf. Pilz 
case, where the Special Court of Cassation of Holland considered that the acts of a Ger-
man military doctor preventing a Dutch soldier from having medical attention and order-
ing, or at least permitting, a subordinate to shoot him did not amount to a crime against 
humanity, among other reasons because the victim was no longer part of the civilian 
population of the occupied territory (In re Pilz, 5 July 1950, Special Court of Cassation of 
Holland, in 17 International Law Reports (1950) 392).
57 Prosecutor v. Blaskić, supra note 55, para. 209.
58 Ibid., para. 214.
59 Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, supra note 56, para. 307; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., supra note 
56, para. 29.
60 Prosecutor v. Tadić, 16 July 1999, icty, Appeal Judgment, it-94-1-a, para. 351; Prosecutor 
v. Kupreškić et al., supra note 2, para. 549; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., 13 September 1996, 
icty, Review of Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
it-95-13-r61, para. 29; Prosecutor v. Galić, supra note 56, para. 143; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
supra note 56, para. 575. Among commentators, Juan Soroeta Liceras, ‘La protección de la 
persona humana en Derecho internacional’, in Carlos Fernández de Casadevante Romaní 
(coord.), Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (Dilex, Madrid, 2003, 2nd ed.), 
p. 50; Paul Martens, ‘L’humanité comme sujet du droit’, in Thomas Berns (dir.), Le droit 
saisi par le collectif (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2004), pp. 210–213.
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more illustrative to consider the need of protection of the victim in the event of 
defencelessness against an organized force, State-like or otherwise, and so, any 
person who is not part of such organized force will be deemed a civilian.61 Some 
have even argued that, in a situation of armed conflict and in the context of 
crimes against humanity, the customary notion of ‘civilian population’ encom-
passes enemy combatants.62 The icty supported this opinion in the Kupreškić 
case, as ‘these rules may be held to possess a broader humanitarian scope and 
purpose than those prohibiting war crimes’.63 In this regard, it should also be 
noted that the definition of crimes against humanity in the amended version 
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East ( imtfe) was  sufficiently 
broad to include military staff among their victims. So, while Article 6(c) of the 
Charter of the imtn deemed murder, extermination, slavery, deportation and 
other inhuman acts ‘committed against any civilian population’ as criminal, 
all reference to the commission against a civilian population was removed in 
Article 5(c) of the Charter of the imtfe.64
All the above makes clear that, regarding crimes against humanity, the ihl 
notion of ‘civilian population’ is insufficient. Up to now, the term has been used 
to cover any possible situation where ihl grants protection to individuals, and 
beyond, as far as enemy combatants may also be part of the civilian popula-
tion. Even if it helps invaluably in its definition, this a priori clear  criterion 
is nonetheless only partially helpful when it comes to determining when a 
population is civilian, for several reasons. First, in times of armed conflict, the 
 protection granted by the rule banning crimes against humanity would  actually 
61 Werle, supra note 39, p. 222; Ambos and Wirth, supra note 40, p. 22.
62 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 
3rd ed.), p. 91; cf. Schwelb, supra note 39, p. 190, at least regarding the crime against 
humanity of persecution. Others do not support this approach, e.g., André Huet and 
Renée Koering-Joulin, Droit pénal international (puf, Paris, 1994), p. 105; Alicia Gil Gil, 
Derecho penal internacional. Especial consideración del delito de genocidio (Tecnos, 
Madrid, 1999), p. 115; Mirko Bagaric and John Morss, ‘In Search of Coherent Jurisprudence 
for International Criminal Law: Correlating Universal Human Responsibilities with 
Universal Human Rights’, 29(2) Suffolk Transnational Law Review (2006) 179 (referring in 
general to ‘enemy service personnel’).
63 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., supra note 2, para. 547. Such an interpretation was also 
admitted by the French Cassation Court in the Barbie case (see Jean-Olivier Viout, ‘The 
Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes against humanity’, 3 Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium 
(1999), 164–165).
64 Amended version available at Solis Horwitz, ‘The Tokyo Trial’, 28 International Concilia-
tion (1950) 484.
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be broader than the one granted by ihl,65 as far as the former would also cover 
enemy combatants. Second, the uncertainties surrounding the definition of 
‘civilian population’ according to ihl, particularly in non-international armed 
conflicts, are imported to the determination of crimes against humanity. Third, 
and more importantly, to the extent that crimes against humanity can be com-
mitted both at war and in peacetime, the identification of civilians in accor-
dance with ihl only is clearly too narrow.66
In this context, it is somehow shocking to see that judges at the icc still 
resort to the ihl definition of civilian, as opposed to members of armed forc-
es and other legitimate combatants.67 Both in Katanga and Bemba the Trial 
Chambers have relied on Article 50 of api to define ‘civilian population’,68 ar-
guing that the definition therein is ‘customary in nature and therefore relevant 
to the consideration of crimes against humanity.69 Compared to the general 
trend to broadly address the civilian status of those targeted by the typical 
attack in crimes against humanity, the icc approach is a setback, as it relies 
on ihl standards to determine whether a population is civilian, particularly 
when the attack is directed against a population including both civilians and 
non-civilians. The Trial Chamber in Bemba deemed that, in such scenario, fac-
tors relevant to determining whether an attack was directed against a civilian 
population are:
the means and methods used in the course of the attack, the status of 
the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the 
 nature of the crimes committed in its course, the form of resistance 
to the  assailants at the time of the attack, and the extent to which the 
65 See Rodney Dixon (rev. by Cristopher K. Hall), ‘Crimes agains Humanity: Chapeau’, in 
Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos, München/Oxford/Baden-Baden, 2008, 2nd ed.), marg. no. 13, p. 181.
66 Werle, supra note 39, p. 222; Bollo Arocena, supra note 39, p. 98; Fenrick, supra note 46, 
p. 86.
67 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, icc, Decision Pursuant to  Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, icc-01/05-01/08, paras. 77–78; Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, 3  October 2011, 
icc, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Inves-
tigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, icc-02/11, para. 33; Prosecutor 
v. Germain Katanga, supra note 1, para. 1102.
68 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 38, para. 152.
69 Ibid.
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 attacking force complied with the precautionary requirements of the 
laws of war.70
As a result, this interpretation of the term can only work when crimes against 
humanity are committed in an armed conflict. This was the case in Katanga 
and Bemba. Instead, the ihl definition of ‘civilian population’ cannot be eas-
ily translated to crimes against humanity committed in peacetime. In fact, 
the  unsuitability of ihl standards to determine the civilian population when 
crimes against humanity are committed in peacetime has led the icc to inter-
pret this term it in a completely different way, based on discrimination, as we 
will discuss in the next section.
3.2 Beyond ihl: The Civilian Requirement in Peacetime
The fact that crimes against humanity can be committed in times of both 
armed conflict and peace makes the ilh distinction between combatants and 
civilians -or between combatants and non-combatants- unsatisfactory when 
applied to crimes against humanity in contexts other than armed conflicts. 
In times of peace, when no armed force is involved, such a distinction lacks 
any sense. This is also true for internal disturbances and tensions that do not 
amount to a niac, even if the government is compelled to resort to police forc-
es or armed units to restore order.71 In fact, international tribunals dealing with 
situations encompassing other than armed conflicts, just like the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ictr) and the icc, have put forward alterna-
tive criteria to determine who is a civilian.
The parameter introduced by the ictr, applicable independently of armed 
conflicts, considers that the notion of ‘civilian population’ excludes person-
nel in charge of maintaining public order and endowed with lawful means to 
 exercise the use of force, as police officers or members of national police.72 
Commentators are divided with regard to the felicity of this interpretation. 
Some deem it as more restrictive than that in a situation of armed conflict.73 
On the contrary, those supporting this criterion believe that what is relevant 
is that they use their power against the civilian population on behalf of the 
70 Ibid., para. 153.
71 Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, supra note 30, para. 4341, pp. 1343–1344.
72 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, 21 May 1999, ictr, Trial Judgment, ictr-95-1-t, 
para. 127.
73 Simon Chesterman, ‘An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes 
against Humanity’, 10(2) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law (2000) 322.
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State apparatus or that of the organized group holding the de facto authority,74 
which is consistent with an interpretation of the term civilian different from 
the one provided by ihl and adapted to the raison d’être of crimes against 
humanity.
The icc case-law provides with another criterion. Although (as already 
mentioned)75 most of the time the icc follows the traditional ihl approach to 
‘civilian population’, it has re-interpreted its scope when it comes to contexts of 
post-electoral violence (Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire), where it identifies the civil-
ian population by a ‘distinguishable group’. Such an approach is not complete-
ly new, though. In the Nikolić case, the icty stated that one of the components 
of the requirement that crimes must be directed against any civilian popula-
tion was that ‘the crimes must be directed at a civilian population, specifically 
identified as a group by the perpetrators of these acts’.76 Furthermore, it must be 
noted that group affiliation has also been considered one of the several factors 
that should be weighed when assessing whether an attack has been directed 
against a civilian population. In Kunarac, the icty indicated that:
In order to determine whether the attack may be said to have been [di-
rected against a civilian population], the Trial Chamber will consider, in-
ter alia, the means and method used in the course of the attack, the status 
of the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the 
nature of the crimes committed in its course, the resistance to the assail-
ants at the time and the extent to which the attacking force may be said 
to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary require-
ments of the laws of war (emphasis added).77
The icc used it for the first time in 2010, regarding the situation in Kenya. In its 
decision on the authorization of an investigation, the icc Pre-Trial Chamber 
ii stated that ‘the potential civilian victims of a crime under article 7 of the 
Statute are groups distinguished by nationality, ethnicity or other distinguish-
ing features’ (emphasis added).78 Besides, it specified that the term ‘civilian 
74 Werle, supra note 39, p. 223; see also María Torres Pérez, La responsabilidad internacional 
del individuo por la comisión de crímenes de lesa humanidad (Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 
2008), p. 127.
75 See supra Section 3.
76 See also Prosecutor v. Nikolić, 20 October 1995, icty, Review of Indictment pursuant to 
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it-94-2-r61, para. 26. Emphasis added.
77 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., supra note 1, para. 91.
78 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, icc, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Re-
public of Kenya, icc-01/09, para. 81.
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 population’ ‘ refers to persons who are civilians as opposed to members of 
armed forces and other legitimate combatants’.79 Although it further relied 
on the discriminatory nature of the attack to determine whether it had been 
directed against a civilian population,80 the statement above-reproduced 
goes far beyond the potential evidences to be weighed when assessing the ci-
vilian nature of the target of the attack. On the contrary, it rather introduces 
an  additional delimitation of the condition of civilian, which will not only be 
 established by the status of the victims (non-combatants – or non-member 
of public order forces, in the ictr approach -) but also by their affiliation to a 
 distinguishable group, these two conditions seemingly being cumulative rath-
er than alternative.
This jurisprudential turn seems to be a misinterpretation of previous icc 
case-law on the scope of the reference to any civilian population. This can 
be inferred from the fact that, in its support, the Chamber in Kenya cites the 
decisions on the confirmation of charges in the Bemba and the Katanga cas-
es, where such a requirement cannot be found. Instead, they clearly say that 
‘the term ‘civilian population’ within the meaning of article 7 of the Statute 
affords rights and protections to ‘any civilian population’ regardless of their 
nationality, ethnicity or other distinguishing feature’.81 As it becomes obvious, 
these words express the contrary of the interpretation given by the Chamber 
in Kenya. But even if one could contend that we are before a distortion of the 
criterion resulting from a misreading, its reiteration in subsequent decisions 
regarding not only the situation in Kenya, but also in Côte d’Ivoire,82 supports 
the conclusion that the icc considers it a proper way to determine the civilian 
nature of a population in times of peace.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., para. 108: ‘in making its assessment whether the attacks were directed against a ci-
vilian population, the Chamber takes into account the information relevant to the status 
of the victims, their ethnic or political affiliation as well as the methods used during the 
attacks’.
81 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 30 September 2008, icc, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, icc-01/04-01/07, para. 399. This idea is later 
rephrased in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 67, para. 76.
82 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 23 
January 2012, icc, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute, icc-01/09-01/11, para. 164; The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 23 January 2012, icc, De-
cision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, icc-01/09-02/11, para. 110; The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, 12 June 2014, icc, De-
cision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo, icc-02/11-01/11, para. 209.
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This approach, however, is not devoid of disadvantages. The relevance given 
by the icc to membership to a group with a certain identity is troublesome 
to the extent that it incorporates discrimination against a group as one of the 
prerequisites of the actus reus of the general chapeau. Nonetheless, discrimi-
nation is not an element therein according to customary international law,83 
but only of the crime against humanity of persecution specifically, where the 
discriminatory intent is a legal component of the crime, and discrimination is 
also required in the actus reus.84
The exclusion of discrimination (and generally of motives) from Article 7 
icc Statute results from the evolution of the customary definition of crimes 
against humanity.85 Until the mid-80s, the prevailing opinion was that crimes 
against humanity were characterized by a special intention of attacking a per-
son precisely for such affiliation.86 From this perspective, the victim of crimes 
against humanity was a certain human group, identified by virtue of crite-
ria such as race, religion or nationality.87 On the contrary, the most modern 
configuration of the category makes clear that any person can be a victim of 
crimes against humanity, not forgetting that protection is afforded for belong-
ing to the civilian population,88 understood in a broad sense.
Notwithstanding the above, the matter of whether or not a discrimina-
tory intent should be required in crimes against humanity was not settled 
83 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., supra note 2, para. 558; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 56, 
para. 568; Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 12 December 
1961, District Court of Jerusalem, in 36 International Law Reports (1968) 41.
84 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 38, para. 694; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, 26 February 
2001, icty, Trial Judgment, it-95-14/2-t, para. 189; Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., 2 February 
2001, icty, Trial Judgment, it-98-30/1-t, para. 184; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, 15 March 2002, 
icty, Trial Judgment, it-97-25-t, para. 431; Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, 31 March 
2003, icty, Trial Judgment, it-98-34-t, para. 634.
85 Darryl Robinson, ‘Defining ‘Crimes against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference’, 93(1) 
American Journal of International Law (1999) 46–47.
86 See International Law Commission, Second report on the draft code of offences against the 
peace and security of mankind, by. Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur (a/cn.4/377 & 
Corr.1), para. 32; Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 38th Session, 
5 May-11 July 1986 (a/41/10), para. 88. See also Rosa Ana Alija Fernández, La persecución 
como crimen contra la humanidad (Publicacions ub, Barcelona, 2011), pp. 144–146.
87 See e.g., Gil Gil, supra note 62, pp. 115–116 and 124–127; Meyrowitz, supra note 39, p. 276; 
Morris and Scharf, supra note 38, p. 81.
88 Claire De Than and Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights (Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, 2003), p. 92.
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until  recently.89 In fact, Article 3 ictr Statute called for an attack launched 
‘against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious 
grounds’.90 Meanwhile, the icty opted in Tadić for requiring it in order to ap-
preciate the commission of crimes against humanity, taking into account the 
report of the Secretary-General91 and the remarks of some States members of 
the Security Council made after the approval of resolution 827 (1993).92  Despite 
this decision, the Trial Chamber was aware that this requirement was not 
 necessary by virtue of customary international law.93 Later, the Appeals Cham-
ber corrected this criterion when affirming that the discriminatory  intent was 
not part of the elements of crimes against humanity with the exception of the 
crime against humanity of persecution.94
Things being so, the requirement for victims to belong to a group can only 
be taken as an indication that the attack has been directed against a collec-
tive target that presumably constitutes a civilian population. Instead, it can-
not be deemed a defining – and reducing – criterion of the notion of ‘civilian 
population’. Therefore, the parties should not be expected to prove such group 
affiliation, as that would increase disproportionately the evidence threshold, 
when belonging to a civilian population has always been interpreted in a broad 
sense.
As we concluded above, the element of the civilian population in crimes 
against humanity committed in an armed conflict is understood as an accu-
mulation of a broad range of situations where ihl grants protection. Out of an 
armed conflict, though, the term ‘civilian population’ loses its sense, as – in the 
absence of combatants – everybody is a civilian. This ascertainment explains 
89 On the uncertainties on this at the preparatory works of the icc State, see Dixon, supra 
note 65, margin n. 3, p. 168.
90 Emphasis added.
91 Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993) (S/25704), para. 48.
92 Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3217th Meeting, Held at Headquarters, 
New York, on Tuesday, 25 May 1993 (s/pv.3217), p. 11 (statement by the representative of 
France), 16 (statement by the representative of the usa) and 45 (statement by the repre-
sentative of the Russian Federation).
93 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 38, para. 650–652; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., supra note 1, 
para. 357. Requiring proving that element as well would have been a strategy to make the 
Appeals Chamber consider the issue and hence clarify it (Olivia Swaak-Goldman, ‘The 
Crime of Persecution in International Criminal Law’, 11(1) Leiden Journal of International 
Law (1998) 151).
94 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 60, paras. 283–305. See also Prosecutor v. Blaskić, supra note 
55, para. 260.
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the attempt of the icc to give sense to the term by distinguishing between 
groups, which is problematic as far as it introduces discrimination as an ele-
ment of the general chapeau. Therefore, a different criterion must be found, 
where the civilian population can be determined while granting it the broad-
est protection. To that extent, the analogy proposed by the ictr to distinguish 
between public forces members endowed with lawful means to exercise the 
use of force can be a much better starting point than the icc requirement of a 
distinguishable group, as we will discuss in the next section.
4 A Potential Solution? Determining the Civilian Population 
on the Basis of International Human Rights Law and General 
International Law on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts
As a result of the difficulties to comprehensively define the civilian population 
as an element of the general chapeau of crimes against humanity, some have 
given up trying. The icty, for instance, has pointed out that the specificity of 
crimes against humanity does not derive from whether the victims are civil-
ians but rather from the scale and organization of the commission of those 
crimes.95 This approach is in consonance with the ground for incriminating 
the specific acts included in the category, given that its goal is to protect the in-
dividuals per se, by means of safeguarding their fundamental human rights.96 
So, the fact that a person targeted by the attack is vested with a specific status 
in accordance with international law at the time of committing the crime has 
no significant effect on the categorization of such conduct as a crime against 
humanity. Quite the contrary, the particular circumstances in which the viola-
tions of human rights take place are much more significant.97 So, if the ‘civilian 
population’ element is not relevant to determine whether crimes against hu-
manity have been committed, the question then is whether it should be sup-
pressed as an element of the general chapeau. We believe, though, that there 
is a point in keeping it: to have enough elements in order to clearly establish 
in which circumstances the most serious crimes amounting to international 
crimes are committed. In any event, this element should be reformulated so 
as to have a single, comprehensive content, valid in all circumstances, and 
95 Prosecutor v. Blaskić, supra note 55, para. 208.
96 Gil Gil, supra note 62, p. 124–125.
97 See Prosecutor v. Blaskić, supra note 55, para. 214; William Schabas, The un International 
Criminal Tribunals. The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, 2006), p. 191.
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 consistent with the scope of the other elements and the spirit of the incrimina-
tion of crimes against humanity.
In doing so, several presumptions must be considered. The first one is the 
need to respect the principles stemming from Article 22(2) icc Statute, name-
ly: strict construction of crimes, prohibition of analogy, and interpretation of 
the definition of a crime in accordance with the in dubio pro reo principle.98 
The second one is the rationale of crimes against humanity, namely, to ensure 
that certain serious violations of human rights are not granted impunity, par-
ticularly when they have been State-sponsored or committed by the de facto 
power over a territory, as it is assumed that otherwise, the State apparatus (or 
the political entity effectively controlling the territory) will pursue the repres-
sion of these behaviours. The third and last presumption is, as already men-
tioned, that crimes against humanity endanger fundamental human rights.99
If the standard of reference is the protection of fundamental human rights, 
one can wonder whether it is possible to define ‘civilian population’ in accor-
dance with the rules governing this matter. Two potential criteria, both deriv-
ing from International human rights Law, can be suggested to determine what 
a civilian population is. The first one would delimitate it by focusing on those 
suffering from the attack, namely, the victims of human rights violations. The 
second one delimitates the term by focusing on those potentially launching 
the attack.
In the first criterion, a possible way to delimitate the civilian population 
would be to equate it to victims in a broad sense (at least including direct and 
indirect victims).100 But even if this is a tempting option, it does not solve 
the question of defining the notion of ‘civilian population’, to the extent that 
this would equate the target of the attack to the victims of the specific crimes 
against humanity.101 As a matter of fact, crimes against humanity are built on 
98 See Mathias Holvoet, The State or Organisational Policy Requirement within the Definition 
of Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute: an Appraisal of the Emerging Jurispru-
dence and the Implementation Practice by icc States Parties, icd Brief 2, October 2013, p. 7, 
<www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/upload/documents/20131111T105507-ICD%20
Brief%20%202%20-%20Holvoet.pdf>, 23 September 2016.
99 See Alija Fernández, supra note 86, pp. 219–220, 225–231.
100 The notion of direct and indirect victims can be found, for instance, in the European 
Court of Human Rights case-law, as collected in its Admissibility Guide, p. 12, <www.dp-rs 
.si/fileadmin/dp.gov.si/pageuploads/RAZNO/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf>, 23 Septem-
ber 2016.
101 Cf. Göran Sluiter, ‘‘Chapeau Elements’ of Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence 
of the un Ad Hoc Tribunals’, in Leila N. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes 
against Humanity (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011), p. 117.
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two levels: the context and the specific criminal conduct. The commission 
of one of the crimes encompassed by the category (e.g., homicide) is not per 
se an international crime, but it needs to be perpetrated in a certain context 
to increase the seriousness of such conduct to the extent that it constitutes 
a danger to international peace and security, and, accordingly, to merit an 
 answer from international law. Hence, a homicide does not constitute a crime 
against humanity if not knowingly connected to a systematic or widespread at-
tack against any civilian population. The contextual element, on the contrary, 
should be shaped independently of the existence of victims, and it is in this 
sphere that the definition of the notion of ‘civilian population’ as the target 
of the attack is relevant. Such notion presents a broad and diffuse nature that 
goes beyond the specific victims, although this should probably be modulated 
in light of the definition of attack provided by the icc Statute,102 as it requires 
the multiple commission of acts referred in Article 7(1) icc Statute. This ulti-
mately implies the need to prove the existence of victims in order to establish 
whether an attack within the sense of crimes against humanity has been com-
mitted, thus leading to a circular argument. Likewise, if the civilian population 
is to include everyone whose fundamental human rights can be potentially 
violated, then all the population would be encompassed, given the universal-
ity of human rights, leading to another useless outcome of the definition of 
‘civilian population’.
Alternatively (second criterion), the term could be defined by the method 
of exclusion, based on the identification of those who can potentially raise 
State responsibility for breaches of fundamental human rights. The civilian 
population would then encompass everyone whose behaviour cannot en-
tail international responsibility of the State. To the extent that International 
 human rights Law grants protection to individuals from the arbitrariness and 
excesses of State power, the State will incur international responsibility for an 
internationally unlawful act if its agents and bodies, acting in such capacity 
(even ultra vires),103 fail to observe its obligations pursuant to international 
law be them treaty-based or derived from general international law (such as re-
specting fundamental human rights). Generally, this would result in excluding 
102 According to Article 7(2)(a) icc Statute, an attack is ‘a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack’.
103 Article 7 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft 
rsiwa). Text of the draft articles available in International Law Commission, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session (23 April −1 June and 
2 July-10 August 2001) (a/56/10), para. 76.
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from the civilian population the State organs or agents launching the attack 
and/or designing the policy underlying such attack. From this perspective, not 
only the army or the police would be excluded from the civilian population, 
but also other State bodies and agents empowered to exercise or order direct 
use of physical force, e.g., the government − as it is normally the one designing 
the policy underlying the attack −, or the civilian authorities in the local sphere 
who ordered the attack.
To determine the composition of the civilian population with reference to 
the general criteria of responsibility of the State for breach of international 
rules in the field of human rights would also permit to exclude from the notion 
of ‘civilian population’ those who discharge duties conferred by the State,104 
bodies provided to a State by another State,105 or individuals acting under the 
direction or control of a State106 or acting in the absence of or by default of offi-
cial authorities.107 The last two cases, in conjunction with the State responsibil-
ity for failing to take necessary measures to prevent the effects of the conduct 
of private parties,108 might also justify the exclusion of paramilitary groups 
from the civilian population. On the contrary, the members of foreign armed 
forces or insurrectional movements would belong to the civilian population ir-
respective of their status under ihl, as admitted by international courts,109 
inasmuch as they deserve the respect of their human rights acknowledged by 
international law – and specifically fundamental human rights – from the State 
under whose jurisdiction they are found. Likewise, this conception of civilian 
population would be perfectly valid for crimes against humanity committed in 
time of war by one party against its own population; a population that, as seen 
above, is almost irrelevant for ihl.110
Our proposal does not disregard the fact that crimes against humanity may 
be committed by organized groups, different from the State, as provided for by 
Article 7(2)(a) of the icc Statute. In the earlier icc case-law two different kinds 
of organizations were envisaged: either ‘groups of persons who govern a spe-
cific territory’ or ‘any organization with the capability to commit a  widespread 
104 Article 5 Draft rsiwa.
105 Article 6 Draft rsiwa.
106 Article 8 Draft rsiwa.
107 Article 9 Draft rsiwa.
108 See General Commentary to Chapter ii of the Draft rsiwa, in International Law Commis-
sion, supra note 103, para. 77, p. 81, (4).
109 See supra Section 3.1.
110 See supra Section 2.
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or systematic attack against a civilian population’.111 The first category would 
adjust to the traditional requirement of ‘control’ over the territory112 that ex-
cludes State responsibility over their acts, while the second one emphasizes 
the capability to launch an attack, in what seems to encompass any group with 
a certain structure and means to do so. Large as this criterion may seem, it is 
considerably reductive compared to the one put forward by Pre-Trial Chamber 
ii in its decision authorizing the opening of an investigation into the situation 
in Kenya. There it stated that an organization could commit crimes against 
humanity insofar it was a group with ‘the capability to perform acts which in-
fringe on basic human values’.113 Further considerations to identify an organi-
zation in the sense of Article 7(2)(a) of the icc Statute would be:
(i) whether the group is under a responsible command, or has an estab-
lished hierarchy; (ii) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to 
carry out a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian  population; 
(iii) whether the group exercises control over part of the territory of a 
State; (iv) whether the group has criminal activities against the  civilian 
population as a primary purpose; (v) whether the group articulates, 
 explicitly or implicitly, an intention to attack a civilian population; 
(vi) whether the group is part of a larger group, which fulfills some or all 
of the abovementioned criteria.114
However, the Chamber insisted on the merely illustrative character of these 
considerations when determining whether a group qualifies as an organiza-
tion under the icc Statute. According to it, ‘while these considerations may 
assist the Chamber in its determination, they do not constitute a rigid legal 
definition, and do not need to be exhaustively fulfilled’.115
Needless to insist on how vague – and therefore inappropriate to define an 
element of a crime – such requirement is, as anyone can infringe basic human 
values. The fact of acting alone or in group is only relevant insofar as, in theory, 
more people will do more harm than one person. But that argument cannot be 
111 See e.g., The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 81, 
para. 396; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 67, para. 81.
112 As held by the United Nations, ‘it is clear that the application of human rights standards 
to non-State actors is particularly relevant in situations where they exercise some  degree 
of control over a given territory and population’, see un/unhcr, International Legal 
 Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflicts (hr/pub/11/01), p. 25.
113 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 78, para. 91.
114 Ibid., para. 93.
115 Ibid.
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enough to turn a group into an organization in the sense of Article 7(2)(a) icc 
Statute. In that case, who would make up the civilian population? The others, 
i.e., those who are not the ones launching the attack? And what if these ones 
are not a distinguishable group, but their only common feature is the purpose 
of attacking and infringing basic human rights? Where is the State left in this 
context? Is not it meant to prosecute and punish such acts? With such a vague 
delimitation of the organization, it is in no way surprising that the Chamber 
relied on discrimination to determine the civilian population, which is none-
theless equally inappropriate as well as insufficient.116
In our view, irrespective of who commits the crime, even if it is an organized 
non-State group, a crime against humanity will exist as long as it is launched 
against anyone who is not a de jure or de facto State agent (the latter including 
non-State actors who exercise some control over territory and people117),  acting 
as such. Therefore, in areas out of reach of the State apparatus, those acting 
in substitution of State organs and agents should also be considered national 
agents, and not civilian population. By the same token, in territories under 
control of a non-State organization, those performing de facto State functions 
will be excluded from the civilian population. However, similarly to ihl, the 
presence of State officials (or analogous) among a mainly civilian population 
should not change the civilian nature of the population. Therefore, only if the 
attack is directed exclusively against acting members of police or armed forces, 
governmental officials or members of paramilitary groups (or analogous), will 
there not be a ‘civilian population’ in the sense of Article 7 icc Statute. Also, 
when among the victims there are State agents off duty, e.g., neighbours of a 
village attacked by a non-State organized group, their civilian condition should 
be acknowledged. As a result of this approach, terrorist attacks and crimes 
committed by organized criminal groups would not a priori qualify as crimes 
against humanity either.118 In order to do so, some State involvement, either by 
116 See supra Section 3.2.
117 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 1999, 2nd ed.), p. 245. In this regard, we agree with Judge 
Kaul, who has deemed that those organizations ‘should partake of some characteristics of 
a State’ that would eventually turn it ‘into an entity which may act like a State or has qua-
si-State abilities’ (Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 78, Judge Kaul’s  dissenting 
opinion, para. 51).
118 It should be kept in mind that terrorist attacks consisting of one single criminal event 
(e.g., 9/11) are not attacks in the sense of Article 7 icc Statute (namely, a course of con-
duct). A literal interpretation of the authentic texts in Spanish and French is enough to 
reach this conclusion. A terrorist attack is translated for ‘atentado terrorista’ in Spanish 
and ‘attentat terroriste’ in French, while both versions of the icc Statute refer to attack 
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action or by omission, or a certain control by the terrorist group over the terri-
tory, would be required.119
In short, this would lead to a contrasting criterion similar to the current 
combatant/non-combatant dichotomy, but based on International human 
rights law combined with customary international law on State responsibility 
for wrongful acts instead of ihl, as the rationale would be protection against 
State (or State-like organizations) arbitrariness rather than protection in times 
of armed conflict. This criterion – which does not require a pre-determination 
of individual responsibility, but remains at the factual level – would also usu-
ally allow a coherent determination of State responsibility for crimes against 
humanity when required.
5 Conclusions
The reference to ‘any civilian population’ as an element of the general chapeau 
of crimes against humanity is a legacy from the ihl distinction between com-
batants and civilians, as a result of the connection with crimes against peace 
and/or war crimes originally required by Article 6 of the Charter of the imtn. 
Although such connection was abandoned at a very early stage in the custom-
ary configuration of crimes against humanity, the requirement of the attack 
being against ‘any civilian population’ remained. In quest of an independent 
meaning of ‘civilian population’ in crimes against humanity, the term has 
progressively separated from the civilian population of ihl and war crimes, 
although in an inconsistent way. This results in the absurdity of  ‘civilian 
population’ having different meanings depending on whether crimes against 
 humanity are committed in times of war or in times of peace.
The icc case-law provides with a clear example of such a duality: in armed 
conflicts, ‘civilian population’ as an element of the general chapeau of crimes 
against humanity includes those who are not members of armed forces and 
other legitimate combatants, while in times of peace it is equated to a distin-
guishable group. However, in times of war, the customary norm resulting from 
the evolution of crimes against humanity as applied by the ad hoc  Tribunals 
(‘ataque’ and ‘attaque’, respectively). Regarding organized criminal groups, one of the fea-
tures of organized crime is its search for influence at the political, administrative and 
judicial level.
119 As stated in note 6 of the Elements of Crimes, the State or the organization can be excep-
tionally involved in the commission of crimes against humanity ‘by a deliberate failure to 
take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack’.
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seems to assimilate the civilian population to non-combatants, namely, 
 civilians and any former combatant (e.g., pow). This is particularly right in 
international armed conflicts; in niac, while the same principle would apply, 
it becomes harder to make a distinction between civilians and combatants, 
especially in unstructured conflicts. In both cases, a ‘pure’ combatant (i.e., 
a combatant in combat) could just clearly be a victim of certain war crimes – 
such as perfidy or use of forbidden weapons. Instead, international tribunals 
have included enemy combatants among the civilian population, and they can 
therefore be victims of any crime against humanity. Hence, in wartime the pro-
hibition of crimes against humanity affords protection to a larger number of 
persons than ihl.
In times of peace, on the contrary, the distinction between civilians and 
combatants lacks any sense. In the absence of combats, the whole population 
is civilian, so the term becomes empty of content. Consequently, international 
tribunals have attempted to provide the notion of ‘civilian population’ with 
some specific meaning, either by substituting combatants for public officers 
endowed with lawful means to exercise the use of force (ictr), or by equating 
it to a distinguishable group (icc). In our opinion, the ictr position offers 
an interesting analogy to the dichotomy combatant/non-combatant and can 
be a good starting point for a comprehensive definition of ‘civilian popula-
tion’. Instead, the icc approach deserves criticism, inasmuch it introduces dis-
crimination as an element of the general chapeau of crimes against humanity, 
despite motives having been excluded from the customary definition of the 
category (discrimination is restricted to the specific crime against humanity 
of persecution).
A single definition of civilian population for crimes against humanity, oper-
ative in times of both war and peace, is therefore needed. Since crimes against 
humanity consist in violations of fundamental human rights, we believe that 
the criterion to define ‘civilian population’ therein should always be based on 
international law of human rights, which follows no other criterion than gen-
eral international law’s one. A civilian population would thus be any individu-
als that are not, de jure or de facto, State agents acting as such. The target of 
the attack would then be defined in a negative way, as anyone not performing 
State functions in the instant case, irrespective of the nature or condition of 
the perpetrator, who would usually be (but not necessarily) a State agent. Such 
single definition would be valid for any crime against humanity, committed 
in times of peace or in times of war, be it international or non-international, 
and would be clearly distinct – at least univocal – from the civilian population 
referred to in war crimes.
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